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Dow Corning Corporation (A): Business Processes and Information Technology
Introduction
In October 1994, Dick Hazleton, CEO of Dow Coming Corporation, was considering actions that
could significantly affect the organization, staffing, and role of the Information Technology (IT)
function in the company. Hazleton and other senior managers had agreed it was imperative to
introduce major improvements in operational efficiency through a process-centered organization,
not only to increase cash flow but to best position the company for long-term competitiveness.
They knew instinctively that IT could play a major role in enabling operational changes, but were
uncertain of just how that would occur or how it should be organized and managed. Hazleton
wanted to move quickly, but knew the success of radical operational and work changes depended
on the full support of his Operating Committee of sixteen senior managers and the support of
every employee.
Background
Dow Coming Corporation was founded in 1943 as a jointly owned enterprise by The Dow
Chemical Company and Coming Incorporated to develop the potential of silicone materials. Dow
Coming's principal businesses were silicone materials and polycrystalline silicon. Silicones are
chemical compounds based on silicon, an element refined from quartz. Silicone products vary
from fluids used for antifoams and lubricants; elastomers used as building sealants, gaskets, and
pacemaker leads; and resins applied as protective coatings. The corporation also manufactured
high purity polycrystalline silicon, the principal intermediate material for semiconductor chips.
In 1994 Dow Coming had sales of $2.2 billion, approximately 8,300 employees and
approximately 45,000 customers worldwide (see Exhibit A-l). It operated out of 29
manufacturing facilities on five continents, with greater than 50% of its sales generated outside
the United States. The company was headquartered in Midland, Michigan, USA, with regional
headquarters in LaHulpe, Belgium and Tokyo, Japan. The firm emphasized eight core values:
integrity, customers, employees, safety, technology, quality, environment, and profit (see Exhibit
A-2). Each year an internal publication reported key metrics on the status of each of these values.
Dow Coming developed, manufactured, and marketed almost 5,000 silicone products and related
specialty chemical materials. Seven to eight percent of sales revenues were regularly devoted to
research and development, and in 1994, twenty percent of revenues were from products
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introduced in the last five years.1 Dow Coming had long competed with large regional and global
companies, such as Shin-Etsu in Asia, Rhone Poulenc and Wacker in Europe and the U.S., and
GE globally, but newer niche players were increasing the pressure on both quality and price. At
the same time, Dow Coming's customers were demanding faster cycle times and greater
responsiveness to unique needs. Management perceived both economies of scale and customer
responsiveness would be essential in order to remain competitive in the global marketplace.
In 1976 top management introduced a unique multidimensional organizational structure that
recognized the diverse demands of business, geographical area, and function. Dow Coming
successfully used this structure, which gave most professionals multiple bosses, while other firms
were failing in their efforts to establish matrixed reporting relationships. Industry experts credited
this structure with providing a major competitive advantage.
The matrix structure allowed Dow Corning to view itself by business group, geographical area,
or specific function. It had two business groups: the Core Products Business Group (CPBG) and
the Advanced Materials Business Group (AMBG). While the two groups had some overlap, they
were distinguished by the CPBG's emphasis on products with established operational excellence
and global reach in contrast to the AMBG's product innovation orientation and focus on local
and regional customer relationships. Geographically, Dow Coming had three areas: Europe, Asia,
and the Americas. Functionally, the firm had four key units: Manufacturing and Engineering,
Science and Technology, Marketing and Sales, and Administration. The heads of the two
business groups, three geographical areas, and eight functions were all company officers.
In its value statement, Dow Coming articulated its commitment to an open and creative culture
that recognized employees as the primary source of ideas, actions, and delivery of performance.
Dow Corning's consistent growth performance had resulted in a stable work environment that
reinforced the loyalty of its employees. Recognizing the value of this stability, the management
team was determined to avoid reengineering initiatives driven solely by the need to downsize the
organization.
The Breast Implant Crisis
In 1992, arguing that manufacturers had not sufficiently demonstrated the safety of breast
implants, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) restricted the sale of silicone gel-filled breast
implants. By that time, Dow Coming, which had been manufacturing implants for almost 30
years, already had discontinued production partly in response to a trickle of lawsuits that
attributed various autoimmune diseases to the implants. The FDA action led to a torrent of
product liability lawsuits. While the link between silicone implants and connective tissue disease
or other illnesses was not supported by scientific evidence, sympathetic juries made multi-million
dollar awards to plaintiffs. By early 1994, over 9,000 lawsuits had been filed against Dow
Corning, which had been the largest manufacturer of breast implants. Both to reduce uncertainty
and to place some limit on the total payout, the major manufacturers in April 1994 agreed to set
' Through 1996 Dow Corning's performance, as characterized by the meters and measures defined in the case, was
positively sustained. Dow Corning's targeted performance through the turn of the century reflects the continuation of
these results.
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aside $4.23 billion for women with breast implants, of which Dow Coming committed
$2 billion.
Intensifying competition and increasing customer requirements, coupled with breast implant
litigation, created a need to meet changing customer expectations and to optimize cash flow. In
1992 and 1993, the firm recorded net operating losses as a result of breast implant-related
charges. While breast implants had been a very small part of the firm's revenues (less than one
percent), the litigation and publicity were consuming significant human and financial resources.
In June 1993, when Richard Hazleton became CEO in addition to his role as president of Dow
Corning, he took on a challenging leadership assignment.
Hazleton promised employees and shareholders he would continue an environment of open
communication concerning both the breast implant crisis and Dow Coming management.
Employees responded to this openness and rallied around Hazleton and the rest of the top
management team. They even voluntarily bought six pages of advertising, costing $5,170 in the
local Midland Daily News. On these six pages, 2,068 employees signed their names to a
statement of support. The message stated:
To: Dow Corning Executive Management
Your Employees are Behind You 100%
Hazleton's continuing commitment to openness extended to the management culture. Charlie
Lacefield, Vice President and Executive Director, Manufacturing and Engineering, described the
environment:
The culture of the corporation is that it is okay to disagree. Management is
comfortable saying "I don't know."
The IT Function at Dow Corning
In 1994, Dow Coming's core IT unit, Systems and Information Management (SIM), had a staff
of 120 headed by a director, who reported to the Vice President of Science and Technology (see
Exhibit A-3). SIM oversaw mainframe transaction processing, which was centralized in Midland,
and the global network that enabled it. The unit was also responsible for telecommunications,
mainframe e-mail (IBM's PROFS), end-user training, and global systems supporting financial
reporting, procurement and process control. The SIM budget had grown from $10 million to $20
million between 1984 and 1994, but as a percentage of sales, the budget had shrunk, representing
less than one percent of sales in 1994.
In 1992 SIM management had issued Dow Corning Information Network Principles in
recognition of the changing business environment and the growth of end-user computing. The
principles described how the company would "tend to do computing in the future."
Key principles included:
· increasingly decentralized IS decision making;
· faster cycle times;
* greater empowerment;
* working closely through standing committees to develop plans, strategies,
policies, priorities, and controls.
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Several of the standing committees were comprised of corporate and regional senior managers.
These included the Systems Management Board (SMB), European Competitive Computing
Board (CCB), Japan-Pacific SMB, and Dow Coming Inter-America (DCIA) SMB. Others were
comprised of local IS staff and power users, such as Dow Coming Information Network (DCIN)
Leadership Council, DCIN User Council, Science & Technology (S&T) Computing Council, and
the Process Information & Control Technology Center. The committees were expected to provide
strategic and technical direction, but Operating Committee members tended not to be involved
with them. Some members of the Operating Committee believed they needed to better
understand the importance of information management.
Top management must declare an IS strategy and approach and then say "do it."
When we tried to do it by consensus-there were too many chiefs.
-Process Manager, Personnel Management Process
The firm's centralized information systems capability had been an important tool for enabling its
multidimensional organizational structure. As such, managers noted that the IS function provided
a competitive advantage in the 1970s. Over time, however, individual functions and sites had
developed their own IS capability to meet unique or immediate business needs. By the early
1990s, IS functions were fairly evenly divided into three parts: SIM, functional IS staff reporting
to functional directors, and IS staff at individual manufacturing facilities. This distribution of IS
resources had led to a proliferation of useful, stand-alone systems. The inability to integrate these
systems within and across sites hampered efforts to develop disciplined processes in support of
globalization:
When I went to the Midland Plant in 1992, I killed more software projects in the
first six months than I had in my whole career. It was becoming an enormously
ugly patchwork quilt. I mean the systems wouldn't talk to each other. Nice
functionality, but they wouldn't talk to each other.
-Midland Site Manager
Top managers were particularly concerned about the lack of global supply chain management. At
Dow Coming the supply chain started with understanding customer requirements and ended with
satisfying those requirements. Thus, it encompassed order entry, manufacturing, and distribution.
In 1991 SIM initiated the GOES project (global order entry system) as a first step toward
addressing global supply chain management needs. GOES was expected to link orders with
manufacturing around the world. The project was very high profile and engaged individuals
throughout the company to define requirements and support implementation. By mid-1994 the
customer management module had been implemented in most parts of Asia and Inter-America,
but the project was well behind schedule and estimated to be at least four years from completion:
GOES struggled because we tried to put a global team together but everyone had
their area perspective of what the requirements should be. It made it very difficult
for us to get our hands around what were really global requirements.
-Project PRIDE Workflow Technical Leader
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In the meantime, Dow Coming had started to investigate the worldwide implementation of SAP,
a software package, as an alternative to integrating the existing supply chain processes and
systems. Many other chemical companies were implementing it, and there was strong sentiment
at Dow Coming that the firm should be buying-not developing-systems of that magnitude.
SAP would be a fast and effective way to get the global discipline on integrated
common systems. It would, if properly implemented, correct for our lack of
internal discipline.
-BPIT Director, Europe
A committee report submitted to Hazleton in the Fall of 1994 noted that SAP would support a
process, rather than functional, approach to managing the company. The report emphasized that
top management commitment and effective communication would be critical to the success of an
SAP implementation. The committee also highlighted that SAP would demand a new technology
infrastructure and new IT skills.
The push towards SAP accompanied growing management sentiment that SIM had a control
mentality and lacked a sense of urgency. Top management felt that the unit had been well-
managed and had capable staff, but that it had been operationally focused and lacked a strategy.
We were state of the art in IT in the mid-1970s. IT was an enabler of success.
Then we got cost conscious and fell behind.
-Operating Committee Member
Hazleton was convinced that the IT function was critical to enabling global process redesign in
the organization. He noted that his goals for IT would be to (1) compress cycle time by getting
necessary information into work processes for faster decision making; (2) focus on global shared
resources and capability; and (3) provide tools and information to support empowerment. While
he understood his goals, he was not sure how to provide the environment for achieving them:
I've been reading on IT but I'm terrified. It's the one area where I don't feel
competent. I sense that we're not getting good value for the money.
Prior to October 1994, Dow Coming had spent considerable time and resources on identifying
the business processes for the corporation. But implementation was only marginally successful
due to aging information systems that were aligned with the more traditional functional
organization. Information systems capabilities that transcended organizational boundaries and
linked the activities of a process-centered organization were an important part of the changes
envisioned by Hazleton and his management team.
Action Steps for Top Management
To address the issues facing SIM and the entire IT function, the Operating Committee had
appointed four of its members as a subcommittee. The "gang of four", as they came to be called,
included the three Vice President/Executive Directors for Science and Technology,
Manufacturing and Engineering, and Human Resources, and the President for the Inter-American
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Area. With the Operating Committee's full support, the committee sponsored an assessment of
IT and sought recommendations from consultants on the role and organization of the entire
function. They particularly were interested in how IT fit into the potential for process change and
the impending implementation of SAP.
Dick Hazleton awaited the consultants' report, but was already thinking of options for how the IT
function should be organized and what kind of manager should lead it. It seemed to him the time
was right for a new era of IT support in the business to begin.
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Exhibit A-1
DOW CORNING CORPORATION
CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF OPERATIONS AND RETAINED EARNINGS
(in millions of dollars except share data)
Year ended December 31,
1993 1992 1991
$2,043.7 $1,955.7 $1,845.4
OPERATING COSTS AND EXPENSES:
Manufacturing cost of sales
Marketing and administrative expenses
Implant costs
Special items
1,403.9 1,343.2
403.9 410.4
640.0 69.0
40.0
2,447.8 1,862.6 1,646.8
OPERATING INCOME (LOSS)
OTHER INCOME (EXPENSE):
Interest income, currency gains (losses) and other, net
Interest expense
INCOME (LOSS) BEFORE INCOME TAXES
(404.1) 93.1
15.4
(33.3)
(20.6)
(22.5)
(422.0) 50.0
Income Tax provision (benefit)
Minority interests' share in income
INCOME (LOSS) BEFORE CUMULATIVE EFFECTS
OF CHANGES IN ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES (1993 -
$(114.80) per share; 1992 - $11.36 per share; 1991 - $54.64
per share)
Cumulative effect of adopting Statement of Financial
Accounting Standards No. 106 - Employers'
Accounting for Post-retirement Benefits Other Than
Pensions, net of applicable income taxes ($(46.72) per
share)
Cumulative effect of adopting Statement of Financial
Accounting Standards No. 109 - Accounting for
Income Taxes ($6.56 per share)
(150.9) 10.1
15.9 11.5
(287.0) 28.4
(116.8)
16.4
Cumulative effect of a change in accounting for
fixed costs recorded in inventory, net of applicable
income taxes ($6.52 per share)
NET INCOME (LOSS) (1993 - $(114.80) per share;
1992 - $(28.80) per share; 1991 - $61.16 per share) (287.0) (72.0)
Retained earnings at beginning of year
Cash Dividends (1992 - $26.20 per share; 1991 - $31.00 per
share)
Retained earnings at end of year
891.3 1,028.8 953.4
(65.5) (77.5)
$ 604.3 $ 891.3 $1,028.8
The Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements are an integral
part of these financial statements
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NET SALES
1,195.5
397.3
25.0
29.0
198.6
31.9
(21.5)
209.0
58.3
14.1
136.6
16.3
152.9
Exhibit A-2
OUR VALUES
Integrity
Our integrity is demonstrated in our ethical conduct and in our respect for the values
cherished by the society of which we are a part.
Employees
Our employees are the source from which our ideas, actions and performance flow. The
full potential of our people is best realized in an environment that breeds fairness, self-
fulfillment, teamwork and dedication to excellence.
Customers
Our relationship with each customer is entered in the spirit of a long-term partnership and
is predicated on making the customer's interests our interests.
Quality
Our never-ending quest for quality performance is based on our understanding of our
customers' needs and our willingness and capability to fulfill those needs.
Technology
Our advancement of chemistry and related sciences in our chosen fields is the Value that
most differentiates Dow Corning.
Environment
Our commitment to the safekeeping of the physical environment is founded on our
appreciation of it as the basis for the existence of life.
Safety
Our attention to safety is based on our full-time commitment to injury-free work,
individual self-worth and a consideration for the well-being of others.
Profit
Our long-term profit growth is essential to our long-term existence. How our profits are
derived, and the purposes for which they are used, are influenced by our Values and our
shareholders.
8
003i0
.1 I
-w - -jI
:EJ-J~~~
0I~~~~~ I_ _ _~~~I
Z; I
I---
0 C
0 0
~3 0
I I0=
II 11 I 1 I - 11 11 I
9
Exhibit A-3
0
0.
0C
CCb4
.)0U
a:
*E00
Ut0
L
0)vn
1J.
O
a)
04
E
0
0
.00
10.
C3
0
.00
0
t--
0
o5:0.O
C/
.0
0
a,G
0
OU
0
C0
L:E
0
0
S:
C
0
b0
0
U
II
t St
i 012
12.0t
0
oU,5
_ 
g 
4)
0
0 CO
z
a
.N
W
";a
t
031C
00r:
._
0
0
00
1 0o
r.
O0
.
0
U
o £12
m 0 a r
00J 0£1m
t4O0
0
U
u U
· I -- I
I
I I
_
I
_
I
_
I
_ 
_
110, I
I
---
I
II
U= _
Center for Information Systems Research
Sloan School of Management
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Dow Corning Corporation (B): Reengineering Global Processes
Introduction
In early March 1997, Charlie Lacefield, Vice President & Executive Director of Business
Processes and Information Technology at Dow Coming Corporation, was reviewing progress on
Project PRIDE (Process Reengineering through Information Delivery Excellence), the
corporation's long-term reengineering effort. The recent pilot implementation of SAP software in
the United Kingdom had been a small, but important, step in providing the systems foundation
for reengineering. The success of the pilot had resulted from intense effort on the part of many
people at the pilot sites and the support organization at corporate headquarters. While some
members of the global team were hoping to slow down and reflect on what they had learned from
the pilot project, Lacefield felt it was important to set an ambitious deadline for the next set of
implementations.
If you want to sustain the momentum of the change program, you have to continue
to have milestones out there that are aggressive and challenging. Otherwise, you
get to the end of the pilot and it is kind of like everything else is going to be
anticlimactic when it is only the beginning. So you need to run a little faster than
when you ran the pilot. Learning should allow you to do that.
Background
Dow Coming Corporation, a jointly owned enterprise of The Dow Chemical Company and
Coming Incorporated, developed and manufactured silicon and silicone-based products for the
global market. The company had a history of consistent growth in sales which reached $2.2
billion in 1994 and $2.5 billion in 1995. As a result of charges to income for current and future
settlements of lawsuits related to silicone gel-filled breast implants, however, Dow Coming had
recorded operating losses in both years. In May 1995, in an attempt to stem potentially
catastrophic impacts of settlements on its financial stability, Dow Coming filed for protection
under Chapter 11 of the federal bankruptcy laws.
In addition to the financial uncertainties stemming from the breast implant crisis, Dow Corning
was facing increasing global competition. The global competition presented requirements for
faster cycle times, lower costs, and greater responsiveness to customer needs. To address these
requirements management felt that it was imperative to reengineer the global supply chain. At the
heart of the reengineering effort was the implementation of SAP/R3.
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Senior management had agreed to the SAP implementation in early 1995 at about the same time
that they had introduced three major changes in IT management. First, a new committee, the
Process and Information Technology Board, consisting of senior level officers was created and
given responsibility for setting the global strategic direction for IT. Second, the IT function was
combined with business process efforts to create a new organizational unit called BPIT (Business
Processes and Information Technology). Third, Charlie Lacefield, the Vice President of
Manufacturing and Engineering, was appointed to the newly created position of Vice President &
Executive Director of Business Processes and Information Technology.
The Process and Information Technology Board undertook serious discussions about key
processes at Dow Corning and the role of information technology. With the support of Dick
Hazleton, the CEO, they proposed that Dow Coming move away from its traditional focus on
function and towards a process orientation that recognized the interdependencies of the
distributed functions and sites in meeting customer needs. They identified four key operational
processes and four decision-making processes (see Exhibit B-1) that demanded seamless
information flows across sites. By reengineering these eight processes, they believed Dow
Corning could radically increase its cost effectiveness and responsiveness.
Hazleton had selected Lacefield to head the IT unit based on the recommendations of
consultants, who had indicated that he was viewed as a forward thinking manager and was well-
respected by senior managers. Lacefield, who did not have an information technology
background, had been a member of the committee which had urged top management to create the
new role. He felt that the IT unit had a talented staff who would become critical to the
reengineering efforts. Lacefield sought to learn everything he could about information technology
through readings and constant communication within and outside Dow Coming. He planned to
establish a limited set of strategic priorities for the IT unit and then "cut loose the IT people so
that they could do things."
At every opportunity Lacefield used the IT decision-making process to reinforce the integration
of business processes and information technology. As a member of the Operating Committee he
wanted to ensure that investment of Information Systems (IS) resources was clearly aligned with
the business process priorities. Functional computing organizations were reorganized into a two-
dimensional federal system with Corporate Information Systems (CIS) providing IT leadership,
synergy and conformance across IS units (see Exhibit B-2), while area IS organizations focused
on implementing IT solutions, providing localized service, and ensuring an effective interface
with users. This modified organization leveraged global systems functionality and infrastructure
capabilities, and reduced the reinvention of computer systems that resulted from decentralized
efforts.
Project PRIDE: Organization
Lacefield made clear that the primary goal of the IT unit was to support Project PRIDE, Dow
Coming's long-term reengineering effort. Management used the graphics in Exhibit B-3 to
communicate their view of the reengineering effort with employees. First, the implementation of
SAP/R3 would facilitate implementation of global transaction processes. While this alone would
generate benefits, the firm anticipated even more significant benefits from the redesign of Dow
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Corning's four core operations processes: customer focus, product delivery, financial
management, and personnel management. Finally, the reengineering would extend to the four
decision-making processes: opportunity development, portfolio management, people
development, and direction and planning. The reengineering efforts had an expected duration of
about ten years. Benefits would grow and people skills would evolve throughout the process.
Dow Corning management decided to invest in the SAP software because analysis showed the
software would enable the company to reengineer its global workflow processes. Contract
negotiations focused on the full suite of software, a single worldwide agreement, maximum user
seat discount rate, and lowest maintenance cost. Implementation of the software was to include
some workflow redesign efforts that would yield visible benefits with delivery of the initial
application, recognizing that radical reengineering initiatives, having a longer timeline, should
not slow the software implementation.
To ensure that the implementation ultimately would lead to radical change in the firm's key
processes, senior management developed a "Top 10" list of reengineering priorities. These
radical change opportunities, shown in Exhibit B-4, provided focus for the SAP/R3
implementation. Top management hoped to achieve full SAP implementation and the Top 10
reengineering priorities by 2000.
In June 1995, a global team of forty well-respected operations and IT professionals was
assembled from sites all over the world and brought to Midland to learn SAP/R3 and to design
global processes. The team was instructed to design workflows around the capabilities of the
software rather than solicit requirements based on current Dow Corning practices. This strategy
resulted both from the learning of the failed Global Order Entry System project, which had
become mired in a consensus building process, and from the understanding that SAP had
attempted to build "best practice" into the software. While many firms implemented only
selected modules from the SAP suite, Dow Corning intended to implement the full range of
capabilities offered by SAP in order to integrate the sales, production, distribution, finance, and
human resource functions.
The team was divided into smaller teams, each focused on one of the SAP software modules.
Each team was to learn the functionality in its area of expertise and to coordinate with the other
units to ensure a good fit between their integrated processes. Despite the fact that Dow Corning
had no prior SAP/R3 expertise, the team was to receive minimal support from consultants.
Ultimately, Dow Coming would have to support SAP in house, both technically and
organizationally, so management opted for bringing employees up the learning curve by having
them lead the implementation process. The vote of confidence boosted global team members'
confidence:
When Charlie Lacefield moved into his role what he had was a very good group
of folks, and what he did was show a lot of confidence in those folks, and it was
genuine. The proof that he felt that way was the fact that he didn't outsource this
thing to Andersen or Price Waterhouse. And not just Charlie but other
management too said, "We're going to let our people do this and we're going to
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put them in charge of this and we'll use consultants when we need to but we have
the expertise to do this." This is proof that management really has confidence in
us and that's a very exciting thing.
-Information Architecture Department Manager
Project PRIDE: SAP Project Management
While the mission of the global team was clear to all its members, the processes for
accomplishing it were not. Team members quickly learned that SAP/R3 was extremely complex
and SAP had little documentation, inadequate training, and a limited installation base to provide
reference points for learning the software and configuring the system. Most of the team members
attended an extensive training session offered by SAP in September 1995, but much of the
training was on SAP/R2 and was not directly transferable to R3. They returned to Midland still
struggling to understand the methodology for simultaneously learning the software, designing
processes, and configuring the system. They were particularly challenged by the highly integrated
nature of the software, which they cited as its greatest strength and its greatest weakness. On the
one hand, the small teams had to focus on a fairly narrow functional area in order to understand
the software's capability. On the other hand, they had to recognize how their configurations
impacted, and were impacted by, other areas, some of which had not yet been explored. They
spent much time hands-on with the SAP/R3 software exploring what it could and could not do.
For purposes of maintainability, Dow Coming was committed to minimizing changes to the SAP
software. Requests for "mods" had to go through the Process and Information Technology Board
because of their implications for software maintenance. In some cases, the Board decided
changes were necessary to enable unique Dow Coming work requirements, and in those cases
programming changes were made. However, team members who requested such mods were often
unsure if the need for a mod resulted from a deficiency in SAP/R3 or from the team's own
inability to learn how SAP allowed a particular process to be performed:
In accounting we decided to value all our transactions in a certain way for
management and do it a different way for statutory requirements, and SAP, to our
knowledge, didn't handle that requirement. So we had to put some programming
in to convert from one to the other. Well now that we've completely examined our
process and we understand what it is we really need to do and what SAP can
really do for us, we'll end up with a far superior process and not have to use the
changes that we made in SAP.
-Project PRIDE Financial Management Module Team Leader
Team members recognized that SAP did not provide full functionality, particularly for
manufacturing. Ultimately, they would need 'some "bolt-ons" which would interface with
SAP/R3 to provide capabilities that SAP had not provided. Growing numbers of vendors were
building "bolt-ons" for capabilities such as bar coding, Electronic Data Interchange (EDI),
Production Planning for the Process Industry (PPPI), and form printing. For the earliest
implementations, the team intended to minimize bolt-ons to ensure that the core of the system
went in successfully, but it meant sacrificing functionality that had existed on Dow Corning
systems in the past:
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When we're talking about functionality such as automated data collection
(bar-coding), our existing applications helped reduce the number of people
necessary to do the tasks. Now if we come back in with less functionality,
obviously they're going to add more human resource to support their business.
That is a concern.
-Project PRIDE Workflow Technical Leader
The team struggled constantly to define its methodology and establish a project plan, but the
complexity of the software and the integration of the individual pieces made that difficult. Team
members noted that prior project experiences did not help them manage this particular project:
Some folks on my team who come from a rigorous manufacturing background
asked, "Where's our project plan?" We're doing a lot of this on faith. I mean how
do you put a plan out there and say, "Learn SAP. OK, you've got two weeks to
learn that and then you've got two more weeks to learn this." You really can't
plan learning or knowledge transfer the way you plan a production schedule.
-Project PRIDE Product Delivery Module Team Leader
In February, 1996, Lacefield observed that the team was losing momentum as they became
overwhelmed by the complexity of the system and its tight integration. He reorganized the team
to reduce the number of leaders from eight to four-one for each of the four core operations
processes-and brought in a new project manager, Ralph Reed, site manager in Midland. He also
set a September 30 deadline for implementation at three pilot sites in the United Kingdom. The
tight deadline motivated the team leaders to delegate more decision making to individual team
members and concern themselves less with reaching consensus:
What's the opposite of a good solution? Another good solution! There's lots of
different ways to do things. Just pick one and get the momentum behind it and
you're going to be successful. I think that's what ended up happening. We picked
one, we got buy-in, and I think we've been successful with that.
-Project PRIDE Product Delivery Module Team Leader
The Transformation of IT at Dow Corning
The repositioning of IT had transformed it from a service unit aligned by business function to an
integral part of the business concerned with business process:
We went from being aligned under a lower level manager to a Vice President that
has pushed BPIT. Ever since Charlie Lacefield took over we have dramatically
changed as an IT organization. And I think the idea of bringing in SAP was great
because it forced us as a company to step up to client server, step up to the
infrastructure. We're getting away from doing a lot of programming to doing
systems integration. I think it's going to enable us, from an IT perspective, to
become more business process oriented, understand that, and open up more doors
within the company.
-Project PRIDE Workflow Technical Leader
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The shift to distributed processing that accompanied SAP introduced a new set of challenges. In
the past, the central unit could provide for all infrastructure needs from Midland. Distributed
processing meant that they would need to localize some services:
Our legacy environment does have multi-language capabilities. Our material
safety data sheet, for example, we're printing in 20 some languages. So we do
have a fair bit of expertise, but what we don't have is a help desk that has
individuals who speak other languages, especially Asian languages. So support's a
major concern in terms of a global support organization that involves local help
desks with local language speaking individuals who have the needed expertise.
-Information Architecture Department Manager
IT management believed that a tightly coordinated infrastructure was needed to make the
distributed computing environment work. They addressed infrastructure requirements through
eleven competency centers (described in Exhibit B-5), staffed full-time by corporate IT and, on a
part-time basis, by IT members of local offices. Leaders of the competency centers met weekly to
address cross-functional concerns. Many of the competency center leaders also led efforts
supporting Project PRIDE. As they developed the infrastructure to support SAP/R3, they
considered the broader needs of Dow Coming. PRIDE was driving IT requirements, and the IT
unit was accomplishing its mission to build capabilities that would support future business needs.
A key initiative supporting Project PRIDE was the GWP (Global Workstation Project). Dow
Corning signed a leasing arrangement with IBM that would put a standard desktop unit loaded
with Windows 95 and Microsoft applications on every desk. The standard desktop unit would be
a key enabler of R3 implementations by ensuring necessary computing power and facilitating
troubleshooting:
GWP is very much the beginning point of implementing SAP in the future,
because we want to have a standard base. A user calls the Help Desk and we don't
have to ask, "Did you get that at Best Buy or Circuit City?" We know what
they've got. If there are problems we simply take a Gold CD and reinstall the
software and it should be up and running again. Even remotely.
-Project PRIDE Workflow Technical Leader
The architecture underlying the R3 implementation called for a centralized database despite the
distributed processing. This architecture recognized both the limitations of the software and the
business requirements of Dow Corning:
SAP articulated the benefits we would get if we had what they call a single image,
a single database. We really felt those benefits were significant. And this was not
largely an IT decision. It was what can we do functionally if we have a single
database, like the ability to do credit checks globally without having the
complexity of having to do them across separate systems that have separate
customer databases and such.
-Information Architecture Department Manager
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The biggest technical challenge of R3 implementation was doing backups, database
reorganizations, and upgrades. SAP was developed under the assumption that the system could
be brought down during operations like these, but downtime was not feasible for a centralized
system supporting global operations. So Dow Corning had invested in a hot site that would
mirror operations and had developed some creative programming that would keep the two
systems in synch during maintenance procedures:
Today to do an upgrade takes 48 hours and there's no faster way-you buy the
fastest hardware, the best people, and still in the best case, it takes 48 hours.
That's 48 hours that the system is not available to users.
-Associate IT Consultant
The Pilot Implementation
The pilot implementation delivered all SAP modules, except Human Resources, to
approximately eighty employees at three sites involved in the rubber supply chain in the United
Kingdom (Barry, Cowbridge, and Manchester). Charlie Lacefield and Ralph Reed worked with
top managers in the region to explain the importance of global process reengineering and the role
of SAP/R3 in supporting that initiative. Management at all three sites prepared employees for
major changes in their processes, although they knew little about the nature of the changes:
The area manufacturing director, the sales and marketing director in the area, and
the financial director, along with the head of IT for Europe got together as a group
and spoke with one voice: "We support this, we're going to do this, we're going
to do this well, we're going to embrace this, we're going to make it work."
-Project PRIDE Product Delivery Module Team Leader
Approximately 25 members of the global team went to the UK to explain the new processes to
employees and to support the implementation process. They arrived around three weeks before
implementation, and in some cases, stayed seven weeks to help local staff adapt to the new
processes. While the global team had specifically avoided learning "as-is" processes because they
were not relevant to determining global best practices, they found that their limited understanding
of local processes hampered their ability to explain new processes:
We didn't know that the person carrying the title of production supervisor was
doing procurement, planning, and scheduling. We had no clue what else this
person was doing. We didn't know their roles in their previous environment and
we were not prepared to tell management these are the jobs that these people are
doing, this is how these jobs are evolving with the new work flows. And that has
been a bottleneck.
-Project PRIDE Customer Focus Module Team Leader
The pilot met the deadline. By September 30, all modules were up and running (except for
Human Resources, which was not scheduled for implementation until most sites were running
the initial installation), but to meet the deadline the team had to abandon some of the
functionality they had hoped to include. For example, they had wanted to automate authorization
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notices for large purchases, but they were unable to get that working well. The team decided to
hold off on this functionality for later implementation. In some cases, such as recording the
movement of goods within a warehouse, the implementation created new work. Yet in spite' of
these problems, individuals at the pilot sites noted the advantages of having a single global
system and were optimistic that benefits at the local sites would accrue over time:
SAP has advantages. At the moment we're experiencing a lot of disadvantages.
We are not realizing productivity gains on a day-to-day basis, but there are control
benefits. I think in five years' time, we'll have an integrated, coherent system
which will free up staff to make better use of information rather than having to
maintain and control the information.
-Chief Accountant, UK Manufacturing Site
For its part, IT's presence at the pilot site was almost invisible by the implementation date. By
then the challenges centered on new workflows, not technical difficulties. Hardware, software
and data were already in place and local power users had accepted responsibility for technical
responsibilities, such as loading data tables and maintaining servers and printers:
We got things in just in the nick of time and it was very stressful. And things were
being tweaked and fixed all the way right up until the day before it went live. An
interesting observation, I think, is that the approach that was used with the goal of
not allowing the schedule to slip was one of adjusting the scope. But you can't do
that with infrastructure. You can't say we're only going to put in 15 workstations
instead of 30, and you can't say we're going to put in part of the local area
network instead of all of it.
-Information Architecture Department Manager
Preparing for Future Implementations
The pilot implementation provided some important learning and Lacefield worked with global
team management to formalize as much of that learning as possible and restructure roles as
appropriate:
Because of the complexity of this you just cannot believe that you have got all the
insights necessary to put the full game plan together. That is one of the reasons
that after each major milestone on Project PRIDE we reassess what the next
dimensions ought to be. Not that there are major wild changes because if you are
out of control then I think you don't have a plan. But adapting a plan from what
you learn is very positive.
-Charlie Lacefield
In particular, the implementation had helped clarify the role of the global team. The global team
had accepted primary responsibility for working with individuals implementing R3 at the pilot
sites. In future implementations, management expects to rely on area teams for implementation
support in order to allow the global team to focus on adding functionality and performing
multiple implementations. The area teams were critical to the firm's ability to fully implement
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SAP by 1999 because the global team could not become personally involved in implementations
at all the sites:
It became obvious to me very quickly that the only way to do a project is to do it
as fast as you can, whether we are building a manufacturing facility or whether we
are doing a PRIDE piece. It also became obvious to me that the core global team,
as we call it, can't do it all. There are just not enough hours in the day or enough
bodies in those hours. Now that means that we have got to expand our horizons
with regard to the number of people who are in the passing judgment mode into
the involvement mode. That means we have to accelerate the training.
-Ralph Reed, Manager, Project PRIDE
The model called for three area teams: one each in Europe, Asia, and the Americas. These teams
were expected to handle eighty percent of implementation needs, while the global team would
provide the remaining support. The European area team had consisted of fourteen persons for the
pilot. Once the global team had left the UK, the area team had responsibility for system and
workflow support. They quickly learned, however, that they had not been adequately trained to
fill that role. Instead, they functioned as mailboxes, where users would submit questions that they
would forward on to the global team. Eventually, the area team members were dropped from the
loop as both individual users and global team members found it more efficient to communicate
directly.
To ensure that area teams were better prepared to support local implementations, management
created the PRIDE Academy, which provided extended training for area team members. Initial
training took place in Midland, where global team members not only taught existing
functionality, but also sought the expertise of area team members on the design of new work
processes. After several weeks in Midland, area team members returned to their local sites where
they were to test the system prior to implementation. Area team members would return
periodically to Midland for additional training and to participate in multiple implementations to
accrue learning from their own experiences. The first class, which included twenty-five Asians,
thirty-two Americans, and nine Europeans, concluded in early March 1997 and entailed three
weeks of intensive training.
Next Steps
As part of the process of redesigning workflows and developing additional functionality, global
team members had started interacting more with functional experts throughout the company.
These "think tanks" assembled individuals who could envision processes associated with the top
ten priorities and who could help define best practices:
In this way we get experience from outside of PRIDE so it expands our experience
base and it also starts to help us communicate and get buy-in for the changes
around the organization. These are highly respected people that we pulled into
this, respected for their technical abilities, respected for their ability to get things
done, to think differently, to think out of the box. In one case, for example, there
are 24 people on the team. You can get a lot of mileage out of 24 people going
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back out into the organization saying, "Listen up here, folks. I just had a hand in
developing this process, and you're going to see it coming your way in a couple of
years."
-Project PRIDE Financial Management Module Team Leader
While these "think tanks" would provide some insights into the R3 implementation, their more
important role was to bridge the initial SAP implementation to the larger reengineering effort.
SAP would lead to some changes and greater discipline, but senior management had purposely
not attempted to accompany the SAP implementation with radical reengineering:
If we slow down and wait for the reengineering to catch up with the software we
are going to lose momentum and we are going to lose the stability of the team.
You can't hold a team together for four or five years. In fact the reengineering
piece has got all this human side of it which is changing people's ways of doing
things and changing the culture which is a longer process than putting the
software in place.
-Charlie Lacefield
The IT unit turned to issues of scale. Supporting the needs of 100 English-speaking users in three
sites was not a problem, but adding sites would create new challenges, such as time-zone
functionality, multiple language capabilities, and meeting scalability requirements:
We have enough hardware easily to handle the 100 users, but no one I've talked
with yet has run 3,000 concurrent users on SAP. In fact, no one has run 2,000. No
one I've talked to has even run 1,000 yet. So the first question is can we be sure
that SAP and the hardware/software will actually scale to what we're expecting it
to do. The second issue is availability. That is very difficult to forecast.
-Associate IT Consultant
IT would be working with the global team to identify and support key bolt-ons. As they moved
into sites that had been highly automated, they anticipated some resistance to a system that would
reduce automation and demand increased human resources. They wanted to meet key needs as
quickly as possible without jeopardizing management's desire to bring on new sites in rapid
succession.
The next implementation would take place in Wiesbaden, Germany in April. Lacefield and Reed
were working to enlist the commitment of management at the sites to the kinds of changes that
were forthcoming. Lacefield had been communicating for over a year with area managers about
the need for Dow Coming to function as a global corporation, and he found support conceptually
for what they were trying to accomplish. He noted that continued top management commitment
was key to his communication efforts:
The real issue that people ask about is management's staying power. Will we
continue to drive at this or somewhere along the line will there be a new flavor of
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the day? That is where management commitment and visibility is absolutely
important.
Management recognized significant risks in attempting a global systems implementation in order
to drive reengineered, common processes and increased discipline around those processes, but
they believe that these efforts were critical to Dow Corning's long-term competitiveness:
People might sit back and say, in an academic sense, what if this thing fails. And
my view is that it is an irrelevant question because we can't go back. All we have
currently is a bunch of old legacy dogs that are going to die. We have got to go
forward and we may not be in the exact place where we think we will be but we
will be close. And that will be successful to me. We have got to do it. The
alternative is nowhere. It has almost ceased to exist. So it has got to succeed and,
by and large, people are willing to do whatever it takes to make it so.
-Ralph Reed
4-16-97
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Exhibit B-5
Information Technology
Competency Centers
I/T COMP. CTR. KEY ACTIVITIES PRINCIPAL DELIVERABLES
Security · IT security policies & standards * Define security framework: Project
* Business continuation planning PRIDE, client/server applications,
* User access: applications, networks, Internet
platforms; databases
Information Technology * Ensure computer literacy · Define and maintain curriculum
(I/T) Skill Development * Coordinate I/T training leaders
* Maintain listing of I/T subject experts
Office * Standards for electronic office tools * Lotus notes & Internet pilots
Tools · Improved C/S Enterprise Office Sys.
Knowledge Delivery * Decision support, expert and exec. * Articulate portfolio of technologies
& Scientific Computing information systems
* Numerical intensive computing
* Neural networks
* Ensure decision support systems standards
Application · Client/Server (C/S) development & * C/S stds. guidelines, SDM & tool kit
Development continuous improvement infrastructure * SAP standards guidelines & release
· Project PRIDE implementation and management strategy
continuous improvement · EDI integration with SAP software
* Legacy systems outsourcing · Global outsourcing strategy
* National language support * National language capability
Network * Network standards & configuration * LAN and WAN services
* Voice services
Hardware & Operating · Hardware standards & configuration: · Define workstation configuration
System Software servers; workstations standard
* IJT asset management
Information * Information warehouse strategy & standards * Document management solution
Management * Document management capabilities * Global C/S repository strategy
* Database management systems * Information warehouse strategy
* Process data repository administration · Sybase versus Oracle decision
· Taxonomy framework
I/T * Architecture definition, strategy, standards * PRIDE technical foundation
Architecture and communication * Client/Server architecture
* Principles & methodologies for managing · I/T decision making methodology for
new technologies/tools technologies, tools
* Client/Server infrastructure
Manufacturing Process * Establish standards & expertise for automated * Generic process control & mass
I/T and Control data collection, process control, laboratory balance methodology
information systems; mfg. execution systems * ADC, MES, LIMS implementation
I/T Standards * Define process for standards development · Define standards review/approval
Methodology and adoption process
* Ensure I/T standards awareness o Identify awareness plan
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